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Closing a Parol Evidence Rule Loophole: The 
Consideration Exception and the Preexisting Duty Rule 
Daniel P. O'Gorman 1 
The parol evidence rule and the preexisting duty rule are two classic 
contract-law doctrines. The parol evidence rule gives primacy to a written 
document over prior negotiations and agreements, and the preexisting duty 
rule provides that a promise to perform, or the performance of, a legal duty is 
not consideration. The former doctrine deals with the contract's content and the 
latter doctrine deals with the agreement's enforceability. One might therefore 
expect that the two would operate in their own corners of contract law without 
conflict. 
Yet an exception to the parol evidence rule permits a party to rely on 
extrinsic evidence to show that a written agreement is not legally binding 
because it is not supported by consideration. If a party seeks to show that a 
written agreement was inf act a modification of a prior oral contract, and 
that the written agreement is not binding because it lacks consideration under 
the preexisting duty rule, the two rules come into conflict and one must give 
way. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that the parol evidence 
rule should give way, and that position has been followed by some courts. Yet 
such an exception to the parol evidence rule threatens to undermine the rule's 
evidentiary function, which is based on the belief that written evidence is more 
reliable than oral evidence, and its gatekeeping function, which is based on a 
distrust of the jury. Accordingly, an accommodation between the two doctrines 
is necessary to avoid undermining the parol evidence rule's purposes. 
This Article maintains that the consideration exception should not apply 
in a case involving a written agreement that a party asserts is an unenforceable 
modification under the preexisting duty rule, as long as the opposing party 
1 Associate Professor, Barry University School of Law. J.D., New York University, 
1993; B.A., University of Central Florida, 1990. The author is indebted to Dean 
Leticia M. Diaz for providing a research grant on behalf of Barry University 
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introduces sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding the prior 
agreement's existence. Such an approach will preserve the parol evidence rule's 
evidentiary and gatekeeping functions. 
Introduction 
The parol evidence rule and the preexisting duty rule are two 
titans of classical contract law. The parol evidence rule gives primacy 
to a written document (a so-called integrated agreement) over prior 
and contemporaneous agreements and negotiations not included 
in the integrated agreement. 2 The preexisting duty rule provides 
that a promise to perform, or the performance of, a legal duty is 
not consideration.3 The former doctrine deals with the contract's 
content4 and the latter with an agreement's enforceability.5 Because 
the doctrines deal with distinct subject matters, one might expect the 
two would peacefully operate in their own corners of contract law. 
Yet an exception to the parol evidence rule permits a party to 
rely on extrinsic evidence to show that an integrated agreement is 
not binding because it is not supported by consideration.6 Thus, if a 
plaintiff seeks to show that an integrated agreement was a modification 
of a prior oral contract, and that the integrated agreement is not 
binding because it lacks consideration under the preexisting duty rule, 
the two doctrines come into conflict and one must give way. 
For example, assume that the plaintiff and the defendant 
entered into a written contract under which the defendant promised 
to build a toolshed for the plaintiff and in exchange the plaintiff 
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 213(1)-(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) ("A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements 
to the extent that it is inconsistent with them. A binding completely integrated 
agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its 
scope."). 
3 See id. § 73 ("Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither 
doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration .... "). 
4 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 107 (6th 
ed. 2009) (noting that the parol evidence rule determines "the content of the 
contract."). 
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (noting that the preexisting duty rule results in the denial of enforcement 
to promises that would otherwise be valid). 
6 See id. § 214 (d) ("Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous 
with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish ... lack 
of consideration .... "). 
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promised to pay the defendant a specified amount of money. After the 
defendant builds the toolshed the plaintiff demands that the defendant 
also paint the toolshed at no extra cost to the plaintiff, alleging that 
the parties orally agreed prior to reducing their agreement to writing 
that the deal included the paint job. The defendant refuses, denying 
the existence of any such oral agreement. The plaintiff therefore sues 
the defendant for breach of contract. The defendant argues that the 
oral agreement never existed and that, even if it did, the failure to 
incorporate it into the written contract discharges it under the parol 
evidence rule. In response, the plaintiff argues that he is seeking to 
introduce the prior oral agreement to show that the written contract 
was in fact a modification of a prior oral agreement that included the 
paint job, and that the subsequent written contract lacks consideration 
under the preexisting duty rule because no new consideration was 
provided to the plaintiff for the deletion of the defendant's duty to 
paint the toolshed. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that in such a 
situation the parol evidence rule should give way to the preexisting duty 
rule and evidence of the prior oral agreement should be admissible, 7 a 
position followed by some courts.8 Yet such an exception to the parol 
evidence rule threatens to undermine the rule's evidentiary function, 
which is based on the belief that written evidence is more reliable 
than oral evidence,9 and its gatekeeping function, which is based on 
7 See id. § 214 cmt. c, illus. 5 ("A and B make an integrated agreement by which 
A promises to complete an unfinished building according to certain plans and 
specifications, and B promises to pay A $2,000 for so doing. It may be shown 
that, by a contract made previously with B, A had promised to erect and 
complete the building for $10,000; that he had not fully completed it though 
paid the whole price. This evidence is admissible to show that there is no 
consideration for B's new promise, since A is promising no more than he is 
bound by his original contract to perform."). 
8 See Audubon Indem. Co. v. Custom Site-Prep, Inc., 358 S.W.3d 309, 316-18 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that parol evidence was admissible to determine 
whether a written agreement that differed from a prior oral agreement was a 
modification that lacked consideration under the preexisting duty rule); Guar. 
Trust Co. ofN.Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 222 F.2d 416, 420-21 (3d 
Cir. 1955) (holding that parol evidence was admissible to show that a written 
agreement that was an attempted modification of a prior agreement lacked 
consideration under the preexisting duty rule). 
9 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1778 (1976) ("The evidentiary function includes both providing 
good evidence of the existence of a transaction and providing good evidence of 
the legal consequences the parties intended should follow."); Joseph M. Perillo, 
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a distrust of the jury. 10 Accordingly, an accommodation between the 
parol evidence rule and the preexisting duty rule is necessary to avoid 
undermining the parol evidence rule's purposes. 
This Article maintains that the parol evidence rule's 
consideration exception should not apply in a case involving a written 
agreement that a party asserts is an unenforceable modification under 
the preexisting duty rule, provided the opposing party introduces 
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding the prior 
agreement's existence. Such an approach preserves the parol evidence 
rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions. 
Part I of this Article provides a background of the parol 
evidence rule. Part II provides a background of the preexisting duty 
rule. Part III discusses how the parol evidence rule's consideration 
exception applies with respect to the preexisting duty rule, and 
why it is a parol evidence rule loophole. Part IV provides a test to 
accommodate the parol evidence rule and the preexisting duty rule, 
thereby closing the loophole. Part V is a brief conclusion. 
I. The Parol Evidence Rule 
A. The Contours of the Parol Evidence Rule 
The parol evidence rule provides that an integrated agreement 
usually supersedes prior and contemporaneous promises and 
agreements that were not incorporated into the integrated agreement. 11 
Specifically, the rule provides that "[a] binding integrated agreement 
discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
them" and "[a] binding completely integrated agreement discharges 
Statute of Frauds in Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 39, 64 (1974) (noting that the purpose of the evidentiary function is 
to "supply and preserve evidence of the contract."). 
10 See Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control 
of the jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 366 (1932) (arguing that the parol evidence rule 
is based on a distrust of the jury). 
11 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 107; see also Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 
53 YALE L.J. 603, 603 (1944) ("When two parties have made a contract and 
have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete 
and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, 
of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the 
purpose of varying or contradicting the writing. This is in substance what is 
called the 'parol evidence rule' .... "). 
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prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope."12 
Despite its name, the rule is not considered a rule of evidence but 
a rule of substantive law, in that it determines contract rights and 
duties. 13 
For the parol evidence rule to apply the parties must 
have manifested assent to a binding integrated agreement. 14 The 
manifestation of assent need not take any particular form, such as 
signing the document, and can include an oral manifestation or even 
assent by silence. 15 But if either of the parties fails to manifest assent 
to the document, there is no integrated agreement and the parol 
evidence rule does not apply. 16 Also, under the so-called conditional-
delivery exception, where the parties to a written document agree 
orally that it is not effective unless and until a particular condition 
occurs, the document is not a binding integrated agreement until 
such condition occurs. 17 
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 213(1)-(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
13 Id.§ 213 cmt. a. But see Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the CommonLaw?-
Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on judicial Practice and the Law's 
Subsequent Development, 1994 Wrs. L. REV. 1119, 1244 n.473 ("These (and 
other) legalists' views [that the parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence] 
may be attributable to their having viewed the contemporary evidentiary 
regime-which favored liberal admission of evidence-as the only possible 
approach to evidence law. For example, Williston appears to justify his claim 
that the parol evidence rule is a matter of substantive law on the basis that 'it 
defines the limits of a contract; it fixes the subject matter for interpretation, 
though not itself a rule of interpretation.' That, of course, is exactly what a rule 
of evidence does: it determines what material is to be subject to the factfinder's 
interpretation.") (citation omitted). 
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 
see also id. cmts. b & c (noting that the court must make the preliminary 
determination that there is an integrated agreement); PERILLO, supra note 
4, at 112 ("The first issue in a parol evidence problem is whether the parties 
intended the writing to be a final embodiment of their agreement in whole or 
in part."). 
15 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) ("The intention of the parties may ... be manifested without 
explicit statement and without signature. A letter, telegram or other informal 
document written by one party may be orally assented to by the other as a final 
expression of some or all of the terms of their agreement."); id. cmt. b, illus. 
2 (providing an example of manifesting assent through silence). 
16 See id. cmt. b, illus. 1 (providing illustration where the parties reduce their oral 
agreement to written form but the parties are not satisfied with the document 
and agree to have it redrafted). 
17 Id.§217. 
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An integrated agreement is "a writing or writings constituting 
a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." 18 Thus, 
the parol evidence rule only applies when the last expression of 
the parties' agreement is written. 19 An integrated agreement need 
not, however, take any particular written form; 20 it can even be 
a written confirmation of the agreement. 21 Also, it need not be a 
complete statement of the parties' deal. 22 But a document intended 
to be tentative and preliminary to a final draft is not an integrated 
agreement. 23 Whether a document has been adopted as an integrated 
agreement is decided by the judge, not the jury, even though it is an 
issue of fact. 24 
Because the parol evidence rule does not apply unless the 
integrated agreement is binding, an integrated agreement does 
not supersede a prior agreement if the integrated agreement 
lacks consideration or is voidable and has been avoided. 25 Thus, 
"[a]greements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the 
adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish ... lack 
of consideration [for the writing] ."26 For example, a majority of courts 
permit extrinsic evidence to show that a recital that consideration has 
been provided is false. 27 Also, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show 
18 Id.§ 209(1). John Henry Wigmore apparently coined the term "integration." 
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: ONE VOLUME EDITION 535 
(1952). 
19 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 107. An integrated agreement that is a confirmation 
of a prior oral agreement is considered a modification of the prior agreement. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. b, illus. 2 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981). 
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 209 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) ("No particular form is required for an integrated agreement."). 
21 Id. cmt. b, illus. 2. 
22 Id.§210(2). 
23 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 112. 
24 Id. at 112-13. 
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213(3), cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
26 Id. § 214(d); see also PERILLO, supra note 4, at 126 ("It is frequently said 
that the parol evidence rule does not preclude the showing of an absence of 
consideration."). 
27 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 126-27; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 218(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("A recital of a fact in an 
integrated agreement may be shown to be untrue."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS 429 (4th ed. 2004) ("Even if a completely integrated agreement 
recites that consideration was given, it may be shown that the recital is 
untrue."). 
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that the only promise made by one of the parties was not intended 
by the parties to be performed, and thus the purported bargain is 
a sham. 28 The rationale for the exception for invalidating causes is 
that the parol evidence rule does not apply unless the integrated 
agreement is binding, and invalidating causes commonly do not 
appear on the document's face. 29 
If the parties manifest assent to a binding integrated 
agreement, the next question is whether the integrated agreement 
discharges the prior or contemporaneous agreement that a party is 
seeking to enforce.30 The parol evidence rule is misnamed in the 
sense that under the rule an integrated agreement can supersede prior 
written agreements as well as prior oral agreements.31 The rule does 
28 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 127. 
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 214 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). Interestingly, requiring that an integrated agreement be binding for the 
common-law parol evidence rule to apply results in a softer parol evidence rule 
for cases governed by the common law than for cases governed by Article 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The U.C.C.'s parol evidence rule 
does not include a requirement that the integrated agreement be binding. See 
u.c.c. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012). Rather, the 
rule applies to" [t]erms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of 
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the 
parties as a final expression of their agreement .... " Id. Under the U.C.C., all 
that is necessary is a finding that "the writing was intended by both parties as 
a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms." Id. cmt. 3. And even if a 
requirement of a "binding" agreement could be supplied through the U.C.C. 
provision incorporating common-law rules, U.C.C. § 1-103, under the U.C.C. 
a modification does not need consideration to be binding, U.C.C. § 2-209(1), 
as long as it meets the test of good faith. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 2. 
Thus, if the transaction involves the sale of goods and is therefore governed 
by Article 2 of the U.C.C., see id. § 2-102 ("Unless the context otherwise 
requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods .... "),the consideration 
exception would not prevent the parol evidence rule from having the effect 
of superseding the prior promise or agreement, unless perhaps it could be 
shown that the integrated agreement was prepared in bad faith by one of the 
parties. If the parties form an oral contract and one of the parties sends a signed, 
written confirmation to the other that includes additional or different terms, 
but the other does not manifest assent to the written confirmation, whether 
the additional or different terms supersede the prior oral agreement would be 
determined by U.C.C. § 2-207(2), not the parol evidence rule. See id. § 2-207 (2). 
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 213(1)-(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
31 See id. cmt. a. 
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not, however, discharge agreements subsequent to the integrated 
agreement, even if they are oral. 32 
If the binding integrated agreement contradicts the prior 
agreement, the prior agreement is discharged,33 even if the integrated 
agreement does not contain all of the terms of the parties' agreement 
(a so-called partial integration) .34 If the integrated agreement does 
not contradict the prior agreement, the prior agreement is still 
discharged if it was not agreed to for separate consideration and 
under the circumstances it would have been natural to include it in 
the integrated agreement. 35 If the prior agreement was agreed to for 
separate consideration or under the circumstances it was natural to 
omit it from the integrated agreement, the prior agreement is not 
discharged under the parol evidence rule and the integrated agreement 
is necessarily a partial integration and not a total integration.36 In 
such a situation, the naturally-omitted agreement is often called 
a "collateral" agreement.37 The natural-inclusion test is applied by 
32 See PERILLO, supra note 4, at 116. Of course, such an attempted modification 
might be unenforceable for other reasons, such as a lack of consideration or 
as contrary to a no-oral-modification clause. 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
34 Id. cmt. b. 
35 See id.§ 216(2); see also PERILLO, supra note 4, at 116 ("Williston's ... rule 
states that when a term not found in the writing is offered into evidence by one 
of the parties and it would have been natural for the parties to have excluded 
that term from the writing, there is a partial integration with respect to that 
term; the term may be admitted into evidence if it does not contradict the 
writing."). 
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 216(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
3 7 McCormick, supra note 10, at 3 71. The idea of a collateral agreement not being 
discharged by a subsequent, integrated agreement gave rise to the so-called 
collateral-agreement test, but whether a prior agreement is collateral to 
the integrated agreement is simply a conclusion reached after applying the 
natural-inclusion test, and not itself a test. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., 
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 434 (5th ed. 2011) ("[T]o determine whether a 
particular extrinsic agreement was a collateral agreement, it is necessary to 
determine whether the parties ordinarily (naturally and normally) include such 
[an agreement] in the particular writing expressing their agreement .... If, 
however, they would not have naturally included such a matter in the writing, 
the extrinsic agreement is called 'collateral' and the evidence is admitted .... 
[Thus], the question of admissibility is determined by the 'natural omission' 
test and not by the label attached to the extrinsic agreement .... The so-called 
'collateral agreement' test is not a test; it is a superfluous conclusory label 
attached after the critical natural omission test has been applied and the court 
has already determined whether the evidence should be admitted."). 
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the court. 38 But if the parol evidence rule does not discharge the 
prior agreement, whether the prior agreement was actually made is 
an issue for the fact-finder. 39 With respect to the natural-inclusion 
test (also called the natural-omission test), there is disagreement as 
to whether an objective test (i.e., what reasonable parties similarly 
situated would have done) or a subjective test (i.e., what the parties 
actually intended) should be applied to determine if it would have been 
natural to include the prior agreement in the integrated agreement.40 
B. Rationales for the Parol Evidence Rule 
Three different rationales have been provided for the parol 
evidence rule: an evidentiary function; a gatekeeping function; and 
a merger (or integration) function. Which of these can legitimately 
claim to be a basis for the rule is critical to determining whether the 
consideration exception undermines any of the parol evidence rule's 
purposes. Accordingly, each of the rationales is discussed below. 
1. Evidentiary Function 
One rationale, popularized by Professor Charles T. 
McCormick, 41 is that, like the Statute of Frauds, the parol evidence 
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210(3) (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) ("Whether an agreement is completely or partially integrated is to be 
determined by the court .... "). 
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
40 See PERILLO, supra note 4, at 116 (stating that under Williston's test, "[t]he 
question of whether it was natural to exclude the proffered term is answered 
by the court's conclusion of what reasonable parties similarly situated would 
naturally do with respect to the term. Williston's rule was adopted by the First 
Restatement and became and probably still is the majority approach . . . . 
Corbin rejects Williston's 'reasonable person' approach and is determined to 
search out the actual intention of the parties. The issue for Corbin is whether 
the parties actually agreed or intended that the writing was a total and 
complete statement of their agreement .... It is clear that Corbin's approach 
undercuts the traditional parol evidence rule .... The trend is now in Corbin's 
direction and will be accelerated by the Restatement (Second) which ... has 
staked out a position similar to Corbin's."); see also McCormick, supra note 10, 
at 379 (stating that the natural-inclusion test is "aimed at abstract impersonal 
probabilities."). 
41 Professor McCormick was a prominent evidence scholar in the mid-twentieth 
century. THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 370 
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rule performs an evidentiary function in that a written document is 
more reliable evidence of an agreement's terms than oral testimony.42 
As Professor E. Allan Farnsworth acknowledged, parties reduce their 
agreements to written form "to provide trustworthy evidence of the 
fact and terms of their agreement and to avoid reliance on uncertain 
memory."43 Presumably, parties do not reduce their agreement to 
writing to simply supersede prior agreements. Under the evidentiary 
rationale, the parol evidence is more akin to a rule of evidence than 
a rule of substantive law. 
Subsequent contract-law scholars have echoed McCormick's 
argument. As stated by Professor Joseph M. Perillo, "[t]he policy 
behind the rule is to give the writing a preferred status so as to render 
it immune to perjured testimony and the risk of 'uncertain testimony 
of slippery memory."'44 Chancellor John Edward Murray, Jr., noted, 
"[s]ince memories of oral understandings are fallible and subject to 
favorable or unfavorable (conscious or unconscious) recollection, the 
recorded evidence of the parties' intention as a permanent record of 
their intention not subject to the vagaries of memory should prevail."45 
And the Restatement (Second) of Contracts seemingly acknowledges 
the parol evidence rule's evidentiary function: "The parties to an 
agreement often reduce all or part of it to writing ... to provide 
reliable evidence of its making and its terms and to avoid trusting 
to uncertain memory .... In the interest of certainty and security of 
transactions, the law gives special effect to a writing .... "46 
(Roger K. Newman ed. 2009). 
42 See McCormick, supra note 10; see also David E. Pierce, Defining the Role of 
Industry Custom and Usage in Oil & Gas Litigation, 57 SMU L. REV. 387, 469 
(2004) ("Professor McCormick popularized the 'evidentiary' rationale for the 
parol evidence rule .... "'). 
43 FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 415. 
44 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 109 (quoting McCormick, supra note 10, at 366-67 
&n.3). 
45 MURRAY, supra note 3 7, at 418; see also JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING 
CONTRACTS 335 (2d ed. 2009) ("Preventing the parties from introducing 
evidence beyond the terms of the written contract limits the parties' 
opportunities to commit perjury. It also avoids the necessity of depending on 
fading and variable memories of the negotiations that led to the creation of the 
contract. Even scrupulously honest people have an uncanny ability to perceive 
events in a manner likely to serve their own interests."). 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 9, topic 3, intro. note (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981). See also Michael L. Closen & Charles N. Faerber, The Case 
That There Is A Common Law Duty of Notaries Public to Create and Preserve Detailed 
journal Records of Their Official Acts, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 231, 257-58 (2009) 
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McCormick acknowledged that the conditional-delivery 
exception to the parol evidence rule and the rule's inapplicability 
to an alleged subsequent oral modification weakened the argument 
that the rule has an evidentiary function, but he did not believe it 
eliminated it.47 He argued that "[e]ach of these escapes from the 
writing presents difficulties to the one who attempts it, and, in any 
event, the fact that protection in some situations has not been perfect, 
does not disprove the desire to furnish it generally."48 
But for the parol evidence rule to perform an evidentiary 
function it must add to existing protections against unreliable 
evidence. For example, even without a parol evidence rule, "judges 
and juries have generally given greater weight to visual evidence 
(in the form of both writings and exhibits) than to oral evidence."49 
As one commentator has explained: 
People are fascinated by the real thing. The bullets 
that were found lodged in the victim's heart, the actual 
handwritten memorandum that was used to seal the 
agreement, the remains of the automobile gas tank that 
ruptured on impact burning the occupants of the car. 
("The legal preference for evidence in the form of a writing over mere oral 
history or testimony is so well established that it rises to the level of a general 
standard of conduct. It is simply well founded in human experience that written 
instruments generated contemporaneously with an event (that is not subject 
to dispute until later) are more likely to be trusted than subsequent orally 
described recollections of the event, as the former represent fresh, unchanged 
and accurate impressions while the latter are subject to the vagaries of human 
memory. This attitude is reflected in a number of the law's earliest and longest-
enduring evidentiary and substantive rules, including ... the parol evidence 
rule .... "); Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. 
L. REV. 51, 122 (1987) ("It seems unlikely ... that the [parol evidence] rule 
is completely untarnished by the desire to exclude unreliable testimony. While 
there are other reasons for giving primacy to written agreements, the rule is at 
least partly based upon the danger that jurors will overvalue testimony about 
oral agreements."); Note, Some Suggested Reforms in the Application of the Paro! 
Evidence Rule to Insurance Contracts, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1017 (1934) ("One 
of the most important practical purposes of the parol evidence rule is to ... 
prevent proof of a contract by untrustworthy testimony."). 
47 McCormick, supra note 10, at 368 n.6. 
48 Id. 
49 Bernard ]. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the 
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229, 241 
(1994). 
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... Until we see something tangible, [the event] is 
something that did not happen, or at least did not 
happen to real people .... so 
A judge could even instruct the jury regarding the weight to be given 
to different forms of evidence to help ensure that the jury does not 
give undue weight to oral testimony compared to written evidence. 
How then does the parol evidence rule serve an evidentiary 
function in a way different from the typical fact-finder's distrust of 
oral testimony compared to written evidence? For those who view 
the parol evidence rule as serving an evidentiary function, it does so 
by operating as a legal formality.s 1 When conducting a parol evidence 
rule analysis, the court assumes that the prior agreement was made, 
and then determines whether the prior agreement is inconsistent with 
the integrated agreement or whether it would have been natural to 
include the prior agreement in the integrated agreement.s2 If the prior 
agreement is either inconsistent with the integrated agreement or it 
would have been natural to include it in the integrated agreement, a 
conclusive presumption arises that, contrary to the testimony of the 
proponent of the evidence, the prior agreement either never occurred 
as alleged or that the parties did not intend it to survive the integrated 
agreement (the proponent's testimony to the contrary being either 
perjured, based on faulty memory, or an unreasonable interpretation 
of what transpired). s3 
The parol evidence rule test has the characteristics of a 
legal formality because it does not ask directly whether the prior 
50 ASHLEY S. LIPSON, ART OF ADVOCACY: DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE § 
2.02 (1994). 
51 See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1691 (referring to the parol evidence rule as a 
legal formality); see also Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and 
CompoundRule, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726, 1743 (2008) ("A legal formality is a type 
of act, such as the utterance of special words or the production of a document 
in a certain form, that has no extralegal significance."). 
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 213(1)-(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
53 See McCormick, supra note 10, at 369 (noting that the parol evidence rule is a 
device that used a formula to determine whether an agreement "is 'conclusively 
presumed' to embody the whole agreement"). 
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agreement existed (in fact it is assumed for purposes of the test that 
it did occur) or whether the parties intended it to be discharged by 
not including it in the integrated agreement. Rather, provided that 
an objective standard is applied, the natural-inclusion test is used as 
a proxy for determining whether the prior agreement existed or, if 
it did, whether the parties intended it to be superseded. This test is 
necessarily over-inclusive in that it will discharge some agreements 
that did exist and that were not intended to be superseded. (It will 
never be under-inclusive because it only discharges promises and 
agreements.) Accordingly, the prior agreement must pass an over-
inclusive, preliminary credibility test before the issue of whether the 
agreement in fact existed and, if so, whether it was intended to be 
superseded by the integrated agreement, is submitted to the fact-
finder for determination. As noted by McCormick, the parol evidence 
rule "enables the judge to head off the difficulty [of whether the 
prior agreement existed and, if so, whether the parties intended it 
to be superseded by the integrated agreement] at its source, not by 
professing to decide any question as to the credibility of the asserted 
oral variation, but by professing to exclude the evidence ... altogether 
because forbidden by a mysterious legal ban."54 
If the objective standard essentially implements the 
reasonably-careful-person standard of negligence law, 55 the reasonably-
careful person would usually incorporate prior agreements into an 
integrated agreement to ensure there was no dispute as to whether 
the agreement existed or whether it was superseded. Note that the 
reasonably-careful person "is not to be identified with any ordinary 
individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a 
prudent and careful person, who is always up to standard."56 If one 
applied the Hand formula to determine how a reasonably-careful 
54 Id. 
55 Under tort law, "[a] person acts negligently if the person does not exercise 
reasonable care under all the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010). And "because a 'reasonably careful person' (or a 'reasonably prudent 
person') is one who acts with reasonable care, the 'reasonable care' standard 
for negligence [in tort law] is basically the same standard expressed in terms 
of the 'reasonably careful person' (or the 'reasonably prudent person')." Id. § 
3 cmt. a. 
56 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984). 
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person would behave under the circumstances, 57 the low cost of 
taking adequate precautions (ensuring that the agreement is included 
in the integrated agreement) would result in the parol evidence rule 
discharging many agreements that in fact existed and that were not 
intended to be superseded.58 
The parol evidence rule operating as a legal formality was 
recognized by Professor Duncan Kennedy, who characterized it as a 
legal formality that "operate[s] through the contradiction of private 
intentions."59 Like other formalities, it "means that unless the parties 
adopt the prescribed mode of manifesting their wishes, they will be 
ignored" (what he termed the "sanction of nullity") .60 Thus, if the 
parties fail to reduce a portion of their oral agreement to written 
form, yet reduce other portions to written form, the parol evidence 
rule might discharge those prior agreements even if such a result is 
contrary to the parties' intentions. 
Interestingly, the parol evidence rule applies the same test 
as a proxy for answering two different questions: whether the prior 
agreement existed and, if it did, whether the parties intended to 
supersede it with the integrated agreement. But the contradiction 
and the natural-inclusion tests do an acceptable job of addressing 
both questions. If the prior agreement is contradicted by the 
integrated agreement or it would have been natural to include the 
prior agreement in the integrated agreement, there is reason to doubt 
both the agreement's existence and whether the parties intended it 
to survive the integrated agreement. 
That the parol evidence rule performs the evidentiary function 
of form does not, however, answer the question of why such a legal 
formality is necessary. Why not simply decide whether the prior 
agreement existed and, if so, whether the parties intended it to be 
discharged by the subsequent agreement, particularly if fact-finders 
tend to favor tangible evidence? As noted by Professor Eric A. Posner, 
57 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, 
J.) (setting forth a formula for determining whether a person's conduct fell 
below the appropriate standard of care for purposes of determining negligence 
liability in tort). 
58 See Daniel P. O'Gorman, Contract Law and the Hand Formula, 75 LA. L. REV. 127, 
156 (2014) (discussing the Hand formula). 
59 Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1691. 
60 Id. at 1692. 
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a court could simply "[a]dmit extrinsic evidence, weigh it against the 
writing, and make an all-things-considered judgment."61 
The reason for the parol evidence rule to be cast as a legal 
formality is because the type of factual determinations involved are 
considered particularly subject to error. As noted by Professor Posner: 
[NJ egotiations that lead up to writings often involve 
give-and-take and take-back. A party might offer a 
particular term X and then retract it when it appears 
that the other party will not reciprocate by offering a 
term that the first party seeks. Courts that go back and 
look at the record of negotiations-often relying on the 
parties' fallible memories-might mistakenly believe 
that term X was agreed to as part of the contract. The 
parol evidence rule ... reflects doubts about judicial 
ability to understand the record of the negotiations. 62 
In fact, parties presumably reduce their agreements to writing to 
avoid unpredictable fact-finding by a court or jury. 
But the cure might be worse than the disease. After all, legal 
formalities result in determinations contrary to the parties' intentions, 
and thus the question arises as to why it is better to err on the side of 
under-enforcement of prior agreements rather than over-enforcement. 
Why is it worse to enforce agreements that never existed than to not 
enforce agreements that did? Either way there will be an error rate. 
Also, the test likely results in an error rate in favor of sophisticated 
parties, who are more likely to know about the parol evidence rule. 
The answer is that the parol evidence rule's purpose of 
avoiding erroneous findings that an agreement had been made is 
considered essential to the stability of contracts, particularly business 
contracts, enabling parties to more accurately determine their rights 
and duties. As stated by one court: 
Without the rule there would be no assurance of the 
enforceability of the written contract. If such assurance 
were removed today from our law, general disaster 
would result, because of the consequent destruction 
61 ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 146 (2011). 
62 Id. 
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of confidence, for the tremendous but closely adjusted 
machinery of modern business cannot function at all 
without confidence in the enforceability of contracts. 63 
As stated by Professor Perillo, "[t]he objective is to secure business 
stability."64 These benefits were further explained by a commentator 
as follows with respect to increasing the predictability of outcomes 
in lawsuits: 
[C]onsider the parol evidence rule, a doctrine usually 
conceived as part of contract, but which, at its core, 
is an evidentiary rule incorporating an approach ... 
which quells fighting among the parties .... By favoring 
documentary evidence over testimony and limiting 
the scope of the jury's fact-finding responsibility, 
the rule eliminates considerable fighting among the 
parties and ousts any need for cross-examination over 
particularly fractious matters. Also, by making more 
certain the factual record with which both parties will 
have to work at trial, the rule eliminates the possibility 
that each party will interpret factual ambiguities in 
its favor while constructing his litigation strategy. 
This diminution in uncertainty, which cuts against 
advocates' tendencies to overestimate the strength of 
their cases, is an important inducement to settlement. 65 
As stated by the New York Court of Appeals in the well-known case 
of Mitchill v. Lath, "[n] otwithstanding injustice here and there, on the 
whole it works for good." 66 
Also, the idea is that once a legal formality becomes well 
known, parties will use it and the instances of injustice caused by the 
formality's over-inclusiveness will be reduced. Legal formalities thus 
perform a "channeling function," encouraging parties to adopt the 
required form. 67 For example, Professor Kennedy noted that the reason 
for ignoring the parties' wishes when applying a legal formality "is to 
63 Cargill Comm'n Co. v. Smartwood, 198 N.W. 536, 538 (Minn. 1924). 
64 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 109. 
65 Rosen, supra note 13, at 1244-46. 
66 Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (N.Y. 1928). 
67 Lon L. Fuller, ConsiderationandForm, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941). 
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force them to be self conscious and to express themselves clearly, not 
to influence the substantive choice about ... what to contract for." 68 
Formalities "are supposed to help parties in communicating clearly 
to the judge which of various alternatives they want him to follow 
in dealing with disputes that may arise later in their relationship."69 
Thus, all that parties need to do is incorporate their prior agreements 
into the integrated agreement, thereby communicating clearly to the 
judge that the agreement exists and that they intend for it to remain 
effective. Therefore, although the parol evidence rule, like the Statute 
of Frauds, causes erroneous determinations in some cases, the hope 
is that the overall error rate will be reduced as parties learn to include 
their entire agreement in the integrated agreement. 
The parol evidence rule's evidentiary function and its role as 
a legal formality cannot be easily ignored because this was the rule's 
original purpose. Early English evidence law adopted a "best evidence" 
approach, "which encouraged production of only the most probative 
pieces of evidence."70 "For example, written evidence always prevailed 
over oral testimony, which was distrusted due to imperfect memory 
and omnipresent partiality, and, among documents, sealed records 
(official memorials of the courts and legislatures) were more reliable 
by law than unsealed records, and so on."71 
Sealed documents were considered the most reliable evidence, 
and therefore could not be varied by a prior unsealed written agreement 
or a prior oral agreement. 72 Thus, at the time there was no need for a 
parol evidence rule. 73 But when the Statute of Frauds was enacted in 
1677, requiring that certain categories of contracts be evidenced by 
a writing signed by the defendant (even if not under seal), concern 
arose that the writing requirement would be rendered meaningless 
if the jury could consider extrinsic evidence. 74 Thus, it was soon held 
that oral evidence could not be introduced to vary writings used to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 75 The idea that the writing was the 
contract then extended from unsealed writings required under the 
68 Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1692. 
69 Id. at 1691. 
70 Rosen, supra note 13, at 1244 n.4 73. 
71 Id. 
72 KEVIN M. TE EVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW 
OF CONTRACT 88 (1990). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 88-89. 
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Statute of Frauds to all writings, and by the late seventeenth century 
a modem parol evidence rule took shape. 76 By the early eighteenth 
century the parol evidence rule appeared in legal treatises. 77 
The rationale for the rule was that the writing provided greater 
certainty, 78 and the parol evidence rule was consistent with not only 
a best-evidence approach, but the objective theory of contract, which 
was the cornerstone of classical contract law. 79 As stated by P.S. Atiyah: 
[A] reason behind the extreme objective approach is to 
be found in the importance of principle. The classical 
contract lawyers assumed that if it was open to a man 
to deny that his apparent intent was his real intent, 
many cases might occur in which the Courts would 
wrongly accept such a defense. In order to exclude the 
possibility of such erroneous decisions being made, 
therefore, it was desirable to exclude the question 
from consideration altogether. This line of reasoning 
is seen perhaps most clearly in those cases in which 
the Courts laid down the parol evidence rule .... 
This rule ... was emphatically affirmed in a case in 
1842 .... Erskine]. expressed clearly the anxiety that 
opening the door to [extrinsic] evidence might simply 
lead to more erroneous than correct decisions. If the 
parol evidence rule were once weakened, he insisted, 
'every man's will and intention, however expressed, 
would be liable to be defeated, not, as now sometimes 
the case, by his own defective expression of that will, 
but contrary to his own plainly declared intention.80 
76 Id. at 89. 
77 Id. at 110 n.240. 
78 Id. 
79 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1743, 1749 (2000) ("[C]lassical contract law doctrines lay almost wholly 
at the objective, standardized, and static poles, and also tended to be binary. 
In contrast, modern contract law employs substantive rather than formal 
reasoning, and pervasively (although not completely) consists of principles 
that are individualized, dynamic, multi-faceted, and, in appropriate cases, 
subjective."). 
80 P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 459-60 
(1979) (quoting Shore v. Wilson, 9 Cl. & F. 514, 8 E.R. 513 (1842); see also 
McCormick, supra note 10, at 367 n.3 ("Coke reports Popham, C.J., as saying, 
in the Countess of Rutland's case: 'Also it would be inconvenient that matters 
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The rule's evidentiary function is still referenced by courts. 81 
Consider the following from a Missouri appellate court: 
In Missouri, we state the parol evidence rule in classical 
terms. In the absence of fraud, accident, mistake, or 
duress, the parol evidence rule prohibits evidence of 
prior or contemporaneous oral agreements which vary 
or contradict the terms of an unambiguous, final and 
complete writing. We justify the rule on two basic, 
classical premises: (I) a written document is more 
reliable and accurate than fallible human memory, and 
(2) varying written terms by extrinsic oral evidence 
opens the door to perjury. 82 
A federal appellate court has also stated: "[T] he parol evidence rule 
both 'promotes the use of, and protects, written agreements; and it 
gives the trial judge a polite means of keeping suspect oral evidence from 
the jury."'83 And another court: "Underlying ... the parol evidence 
rule ... is the rationale that claims based upon oral representations are 
inherently unreliable."84 
in writing made by advice and on consideration, and which finally import the 
certain truth of the agreement of the parties, should be controlled by averment 
of the parties, to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory."'). 
81 See Demetree v. Commonwealth Trust Co., No. Civ. A. 14354, 1996 WL 494910, 
at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1996) ("The theoretical underpinnings of the parol 
evidence rule are particularly applicable in cases such as this one where a 
very long period has passed since the execution of the contract, making oral 
testimony concerning expectations of the parties at the time potentially less 
reliable. See 32A C.J.S., EVIDENCE§ 851, p. 216 (1964) (the parol evidence 
rule is founded on the maxim that 'written evidence is so much more certain 
and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be 
unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to 
permit weaker evidence to control')."). 
82 Jake C. Byers, Inc. v.J.B.C. Invs., 834 S.W.2d 806, 811-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
83 Intercorp, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 877 F.2d 1524, 153 7 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis 
added) (quoting G. Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Contracts-Impact 
of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Paro/Evidence Rule, 44 Mo. L. REV. 651, 654 
(1979)). 
84 Cirillo v. Slomin's Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 759, 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (emphasis 
added). 
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2. Gatekeeping Function 
Professor McCormick also argued that the parol evidence rule 
was based on distrust of the jury. ss He asserted that the proponent 
of the extrinsic agreement was often the economic underdog and 
among the "have nots," and the opponent of the prior agreement 
often among the "haves."s6 He thus believed that "[t]he average 
jury will, other things being equal, lean strongly in favor of the side 
which is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by 
enforcement of the writing."s7 
McCormick considered oral testimony inherently unreliable 
because of the passage of time and the conscious or unconscious 
bias of the party testifying about the oral agreement, and that it was 
doubtful whether a jury was likely to take sufficient account of this 
unreliability.ss Also, upon concluding that a prior, oral agreement 
existed, it would be even more difficult for a jury to conclude that 
the parties intended the integrated agreement to supersede the 
prior, oral agreement. s9 The danger was heighted by the jury being 
untrained, and "a body numerous enough to invite emotional organ-
playing by counsel."90 McCormick argued that "[f]rom all these 
sources springs grave danger that honest expectations, based upon 
carefully considered written transactions, may be defeated through 
the sympathetic, if not credulous, acceptance by juries of fabricated 
or wish-born oral agreements."91 
In contrast to juries, McCormick believed that 
[t]he danger of undermining confidence in written 
bargains is one which can be appreciated by a trial 
judge, who looks back on many similar cases and is 
trained to take a long view. Moreover, he is likely ... 
to discount testimony for the warping of self-interest. 
The jury, on the other hand, is likely to pass over these 
85 See McCormick, supra note 10, at 366. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 366-67. 
89 Id. at 367. 
90 Id. at 368. 
91 Id. at 367. 
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considerations in its urge of sympathy for a party 
whom the shoe of the written contract pinches.92 
327 
Thus, McCormick maintained "[t]hat the parol evidence rule chiefly 
stems from an anxiety to protect written bargains from re-writing by 
juries .... "93 By creating a rule to be applied by the court, the court 
can play a gatekeeping function, ensuring that the prior agreement 
passes a court-imposed test prior to being submitted to the jury, who, 
only then, would be permitted to determine whether the agreement 
was actually made. 
Of course, whether the prior agreement was actually made, 
and, if so, whether the parties intended it to be superseded by the 
integrated agreement, could itself have simply been made an issue for 
the judge rather than the jury, but this was precluded by the notion 
that the jury was a "symbol of political liberty."94 
Forbidden this straight path by their own 
preconceptions, by a zig-zag route [the courts] came 
out near the same goal. The approach was made 
through doctrinal devices which gave no hint of any 
departure from the usual division of functions between 
judge and jury, but which were subtly convenient for 
jury control in cases where written transactions were 
threatened by claims of agreed oral variations not 
credited by the judge.95 
In other words, a test was created where little or no fact-finding 
would be performed by the court. 
The gatekeeping function cannot fully explain, however, the 
parol evidence rule. For example, while Professor Arthur L. Corbin 
92 Id. at 367-68. 
93 Id. at 368 n.6. 
94 Id. at 368-69. 
95 Id. at 369. McCormick argues that phrasing the question as whether the prior, 
oral agreement was "collateral" to the integrated agreement provided further 
facial support for the issue being for the court: "The word [collateral], through 
long usage in other connections, had acquired a rich patina of technical legalism. 
Consequently, it would not occur to any one to suggest the submission to a jury 
of the question whether an alleged oral warranty by a landlord (at the time of 
making a written lease) that the drains of the house were in good order, was 
'collateral' to the lease." Id. at 371. 
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acknowledged that there might be truth to McCormick's argument 
when the rule is applied in jury cases, he was quick to point out that 
the rule also applied in bench trials.96 But this can be explained by a 
desire to have the rule protect against the possibility that judges will 
also be sympathetic to the economic underdog. In any event, "the 
pervasive attitude that judges provide the best protection against 
perjured testimony probably has been the reason for [the rule's] 
continued viability."97 
3. Merger (or Integration) Function 
A third rationale for the parol evidence rule is that "the offered 
term is excluded because it has been superseded by the writing, that 
is, it was not intended to survive the writing-a theory of merger 
[or integration]."98 This theory was pioneered by Professor James 
Bradley Thayer in the late nineteenth century99 and later supported 
by his former student John Henry Wigmore in the early twentieth 
century. 100 "Viewed in this way, the rule simply affirms the primacy of 
a subsequent agreement over prior negotiations and even over prior 
agreements." 101 Professor Michael B. Metzger explained the merger 
rationale as follows: 
Under this view, the parol evidence rule is nothing 
more than a particularized version of the basic 
96 Corbin, supra note 11, at 609. 
97 Michael B. Metzger, The Paro! Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 
36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (1983). 
98 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 109; see also McCormick, supra note 10, at 374 
(referring to the rationale as "the theory of 'integration"'). 
99 ]AMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 409 (1898). Thayer was a professor at Harvard Law School 
in the late nineteenth century, and his book A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 
at the Common Law was a meticulous historical study on the roots of evidence. 
Newman, supra note 41, at 540. 
100 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE c. 86 (2d ed. 1923). Wigmore was a professor at 
Northwestern University Law School in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and the leading evidence scholar in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Newman, supra note 41, at 588. He served as the dean of the law 
school for 28 years. Id. 
101 FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 418. See also Pierce, supra note 42, at 469 ("The 
most logical rationale for the parol evidence rule is the 'merger' concept that 
a subsequent integrated writing of the parties will discharge all prior oral or 
written agreements."). 
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contractual interpretation rule which stipulates that 
later final expressions of intent prevail over earlier 
tentative expressions of intent .... 
Under this view the primary purpose of the rule is 
to prevent courts from interpreting earlier, tentative 
agreements or negotiations as part of an integrated 
writing that the parties actually intended as the final 
expression of their agreement. Thus, according to this 
view the rule's justification is based upon the finality 
of the parties' written agreement. Courts exclude 
oral or written terms extraneous to such a writing 
not because doubt exists concerning the terms' reliability, 
but rather because the terms are irrelevant, since the 
parties superseded them in the final integrated writing. 
This last view of the rule-the rule as insurer that 
the final expression of intent governs-seems to be 
currently in vogue. 102 
329 
Importantly, Professor Corbin believed the merger rationale 
was the parol evidence rule's true basis: 
Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be 
discharged or modified by subsequent agreement of 
the parties. No contract whether oral or written can be 
varied, contradicted, or discharged by an antecedent 
agreement. Today may control the effect of what 
happened yesterday; but what happened yesterday 
cannot change the effect of what happens today. 
This, it is believed, is the substance of what has been 
unfortunately called the 'parol evidence rule.' 103 
Later, Professor Farnsworth agreed that "[i]t is this purpose that the 
parol evidence rule ought to serve-giving legal effect to whatever 
intention the parties may have had to make their writing a complete 
expression of the agreement that they reached, to the exclusion of all 
102 Metzger, supra note 97, at 1389-90 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
103 Corbin, supra note 11, at 607. 
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prior negotiations, whether oral or written."104 He agreed with Corbin 
that the "the true basis of the parol evidence rule is something other 
than a desire to keep from the jury an inherently unreliable type of 
evidence. "105 
The merger rationale is supported by the fact that the parol 
evidence rule applies to prior written evidence in addition to prior oral 
evidence; 106 there is no special rule precluding the admissibility of an 
oral modification of a written contract; 107 and the rule is considered 
a rule of substantive law, not a rule of evidence. 108 
If the merger theory is accepted, the parol evidence rule 
analysis becomes not much different from determining whether 
a subsequent oral agreement supersedes a prior oral or written 
agreement. 109 There remain, however, important differences. The parol 
evidence rule might still operate as an over-inclusive legal formality. 
For example, the use of the contradiction and natural-inclusion tests 
as a proxy for determining whether merger was intended results 
in a test different from that employed when deciding whether an 
oral agreement supersedes a prior written agreement, at least if an 
objective natural-inclusion standard is used. Of course, if a subjective 
standard is used any difference would seem to disappear, except that 
the issue remains one for the court, not the jury. 
104 FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 418. 
105 Id. at 417. 
106 MURRAY, supra note 37, at 418; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 416 
("That the rule is not limited to oral negotiations is clear. A host of cases have 
applied the so-called parol evidence rule to exclude such writings as letters, 
telegrams, memoranda, and preliminary drafts exchanged by the parties before 
execution of a final written agreement."). 
107 Corbin, supra note 11, at 609. 
108 FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 417. 
109 McCormick, supra note 10, at 374. See also MURRAY, supra note 37, at 417-18 
("Where the subsequent agreement is oral, the question is simply whether the 
parties intended the subsequent expression to control the earlier expression 
of agreement. Courts have no difficulty analyzing that question in the usual 
fashion of whether the subsequent agreement was so intended by the parties. 
They so do without mentioning the parol evidence rule. An oral subsequent 
agreement may constitute a final and complete expression of the parties' 
intended agreement."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Indeed, the parties to an oral agreement 
may choose their words with such explicit precision and completeness that 
the same legal consequences follow as where there is a completely integrated 
agreement."). 
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Whether the merger theory has been widely accepted is a 
matter of contention. Chancellor Murray maintained that Corbin's 
view has not been accepted by the courts or the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, though it influenced the Restatement. 110 In contrast, 
Farnsworth argued that while "[t]he view that the rule is evidentiary 
in purpose once had currency ... [n]ow the conceit that the parol 
evidence rule is rooted in the relative unreliability of testimony based 
on 'slippery memory,' in contrast with the 'certain truth' afforded by 
a writing, has fallen from favor."m Metzger, in the 1980s, likewise 
argued that the merger theory "seems to be currently in vogue."112 
Farnsworth acknowledged, however, that the evidentiary purpose 
"has not vanished entirely."113 
4. Conclusion Regarding the Rationales for the Parol 
Evidence Rule 
Although the merger theory appears to be in vogue, 114 the 
evidentiary function and the gatekeeping function remain important 
justifications for the rule. 115 First, as previously discussed, the merger 
theory has not been widely accepted by the courts, and would likely 
be a surprise to practicing lawyers. In fact, courts continue to explain 
the rule in terms of the unreliability of parol evidence. 116 Second, 
most parol evidence rule issues involve whether the prior agreement 
was in fact made, not whether the parties intended the integrated 
agreement to supersede an acknowledged prior agreement. 117 Third, 
although aspects of the parol evidence rule weaken the evidentiary 
and gatekeeping rationales, rarely are the substantive bases for rules 
implemented perfectly. Also, there is no reason to believe that the rule 
is not justified by multiple bases, and that some aspects of the rule 
can only be explained by reference to one of the bases. Merely because 
a particular aspect of the rule can only be explained by one basis 
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the other bases do not 
play a role with respect to other aspects of the rule. Accordingly, the 
110 MURRAY,supranote37,at418. 
111 FARNSWORTH,supranote27,at416. 
112 Metzger, supra note 97, at 1389-90. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1390. 
115 See id. at 1391. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
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evidentiary and gatekeeping functions should be taken into account 
when applying the rule and its exceptions. 
II. The Preexisting Duty Rule 
The preexisting duty rule provides that the promise to 
perform, or the performance of, a legal duty that is neither doubtful 
nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration.118 Thus, a 
promise to perform an existing contract duty is not consideration for 
a contract modification because the promisor is under a preexisting 
duty to perform as promised. 119 Rather, "a modification to an existing 
contract must be supported by consideration independent from that 
which was given in order to form the original contract."120 
The preexisting duty rule dates to the sixteenth century 
and was an outgrowth of the existing rule that a promise given in 
recognition of a past benefit was not consideration. 121 For example, in 
Greenleaf v. Barker a creditor promised to pay 20 shillings if the debtor 
would pay the 5 pounds owed by him. 122 The King's Bench held that 
the creditor's promise was unenforceable because the debtor in 
exchange promised no more than the performance of his preexisting 
legal duty. 123 After some subsequent cases with contrary holdings, the 
preexisting duty rule was confirmed in Stilk v. Myrick in 1809, in which 
a ship captain's promise to pay additional wages to sailors after two 
members of the crew deserted was held unenforceable. 124 
Two rationales have been provided for the preexisting duty rule. 
The first is formalistic, and "a logical consequence of the doctrine of 
consideration and its requirement of detriment .... "125 Consideration 
for a promise has typically been described as something that is either 
118 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 
PERILLO, supra note 4, at 162. 
119 MURRAY, supra note 37, at 277. 
120 Lokan & Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Beef Processing, LLC, 311 P.3d 1285, 1288 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2013). 
121 TEEVEN, supra note 72, at 69. 
122 Greenleaf v. Barker, 78 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B. 1590), reprinted in C. FIFO OT, 
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 
403-04 (1949). 
123 TEEVEN, supra note 72, at 69. 
124 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (1809). For a critical commentary on how the decision in 
Stilk v. Myrick became the "rule of Stilk v. Myrick," see GRANT GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT 22-28 (1974). 
125 PERILLO, supra note 4, at 162. 
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a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor. 126 For 
example, the classic definition of consideration was provided by the 
English Exchequer Chamber in Currie v. Misa as follows: ''A valuable 
consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist of either some right, 
interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, 
detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by 
the other." 127 Under the formalistic rationale, promising to perform, 
or the performance of, a preexisting duty might be a detriment to the 
promisor or a benefit to the promisee, but it is not a "legal detriment" 
or "legal benefit," i.e., a detriment or benefit "in the sense of the law." 
The second rationale is practical: the preexisting duty rule 
polices against unfair pressure. Under this theory, without the 
preexisting duty rule 
anyone who knows that the other party to the 
contract would face economic and other difficulties 
if the promisor refused to perform absent additional 
consideration would be able to exact an enforceable 
promise to pay additional consideration before 
performing his contractual duty. The pre-existing duty 
rule, therefore, provides an effective defense against 
such extorted promises. 128 
And "[b] ecause of the likelihood that the promise was obtained by an 
express or implied threat to withhold performance of a legal duty, the 
promise does not have the presumptive social utility normally found 
in a bargain."129 ''And the lack of social utility in such bargains provides 
what modern justification there is for the rule that performance of a 
contractual duty is not consideration for [the] new promise."130 
For example, in Alaska Packers Association v. Domenico, salmon 
fishermen sued their former employer for additional wages promised 
by the employer. 131 The fishermen, after arriving in Alaska, had 
refused to work unless paid more wages than agreed to between the 
126 FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 47. 
127 [1875] LR 10 Ex. 153, 162 (Eng.). 
128 MURRAY, supra note 37, at 277. 
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
130 Id. cmt. c. 
131 Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 100 (9th Cir. 1902). 
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parties. 132 The employer, unable to obtain replacement workers on 
such short notice and in such a remote location, ultimately acceded 
to the fishermen's demand and promised to pay the additional 
wages. 133 After the salmon season ended, the fishermen demanded the 
additional wages but the employer refused to pay. 134 The fishermen 
sued, but the court, not having to address the issue of duress, held 
that the promise was unenforceable because of the preexisting duty 
rule: "Consent to such a demand, under such circumstances, if given, 
was, in our opinion, without consideration, for the reason that it was 
based solely upon the [fishermen's] agreement to render the exact 
services, and none other, that they were already under contract to 
render. "135 
This rationale treats the preexisting duty rule as just that, a 
"rule," rather than a standard, 136 in that the rule "renders unnecessary 
any inquiry into the existence of such an invalidating cause, and 
denies enforcement to some promises which would otherwise be 
valid." 137 Accordingly, it creates a conclusive presumption of extortion 
based simply on the likelihood of extortion. The pre-existing duty 
rule has therefore been criticized because it applies even when the 
modification is made in good faith and not because of wrongful 
pressure. 138 
132 Id. at 100-01. 
133 Id. at 101. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 102. 
136 See MindGames, Inc. v. W. Pub!' g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (''A rule 
singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them conclusive oflegal liability; 
a standard permits consideration of all or at least most facts that are relevant 
to the standard's rationale. A speed limit is a rule; negligence is a standard."); 
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1687-94 (discussing the distinction between rules 
and standards). 
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
138 MURRAY, supra note 37, at 278-79; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 
270 ("Courts have become increasingly hostile to the pre-existing duty rule . 
. . . Although it serves in some instances to give relief to a promisor that has 
been subjected to overreaching, it serves in other instances to frustrate the 
expectations of a promisee that has fairly negotiated a modification. It does 
not, for example, distinguish between the situation in which the contractor's 
demand for more money is motivated merely by opportunism and greed and the 
situation in which the demand is prompted by the discovery of circumstances 
or the occurrence of events that makes the contractor's performance much 
more burdensome."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 cmt. 
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For example, in Levine v. Blumenthal, the plaintiff leased to the 
defendants premises for the operation of a retail clothing store. 139 
The defendants alleged that during the lease term they informed 
the plaintiff that it was impossible for them to pay the increased 
rent required for the second year of the lease term because their 
business was suffering, and the plaintiff agreed to not increase it until 
their business improved.140 When the lease term expired without 
the defendants exercising an option to renew, the plaintiff sued the 
defendants for the additional rent that had not been paid. 141 The court 
held that the plaintiff's promise to accept reduced rent, even if made, 
was unenforceable because it lacked consideration: 
It is elementary that the subsequent agreement, to 
impose the obligation of a contract, must rest upon a 
new and independent consideration .... The principle 
is firmly imbedded in our jurisprudence that a promise 
to do what the promisor is already legally bound to do 
is an unreal consideration. It has been criticized, at 
least in some of its special applications, as 'mediaeval' 
and wholly artificial-one that operates to defeat 
the 'reasonable bargains of business men.' But these 
strictures are not well grounded. They reject the basic 
principle that a consideration, to support a contract, 
consists either of a benefit to the promisor or a 
detriment to the promisee-a doctrine that has always 
been fundamental in our conception of consideration. 
It is a principle, almost universally accepted, that an 
act or forebearance required by a legal duty owing to 
the promisor that is neither doubtful nor the subject 
of honest and reasonable dispute is not a sufficient 
consideration .... 
c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[T]he rule has not been limited to cases where 
there was a possibility of unfair pressure, and it has [therefore] been much 
criticized as resting on scholastic logic."). 
139 Levine v. Blumenthal, 186 A. 457, 457 (N.J. 1936), aff'd, 189 A. 54 (N.J. Ct. 
Err. &App. 1937). 
140 Id. at 457. 
141 Jd.at457-58. 
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So tested, the secondary agreement at issue is not 
supported by a valid consideration; and it therefore 
created no legal obligation. General economic 
adversity, however disastrous it may be in its individual 
consequences, is never a warrant for judicial abrogation 
of this primary principle of the law of contracts. 142 
Thus, the absence of wrongful pressure was irrelevant; the lack of 
new consideration meant the modification was not binding. 
As a result of criticism, the preexisting duty rule has been 
subject to a variety of exceptions. For example, under Article 2 of the 
U. C. C. a modification involving a transaction in goods does not require 
consideration to be enforceable. 143 Rather, the modification need only 
meet the test of good faith. 144 Thus, the question of extortion is 
addressed directly, rather than through a prophylactic rule such as the 
preexisting duty rule. Also, the preexisting duty rule does not apply 
if the legal duty is either doubtful or the subject of honest dispute. 145 
Further, if the asserted preexisting duty is voidable or unenforceable 
the person is not considered under a duty to perform. 146 Thus, if 
the parties enter into a voidable contract, a subsequent modification 
that is favorable to just one party, and that is not voidable, is binding 
despite the preexisting duty rule. 147 Similarly, if an oral agreement 
is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, a subsequent written 
modification that is favorable to just one party is binding despite the 
preexisting duty rule. Detrimental reliance on a modification that 
lacks consideration could also make the modification binding under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 148 Further, under the so-called 
unanticipated-circumstances doctrine, "[a] promise modifying a duty 
under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding ... if 
the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not 
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made .... "149 
142 Id. at 458-59. 
143 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012). 
144 Id. cmt. 2. 
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
146 Id. cmt. e. 
147 Id.cmt.e,illus.13. 
148 Seeid.§90(1). 
149 Id. § 89. If the court in Levine v. Blumenthal, 186 A. 457, 457 (NJ. 1936), 
aff'd, 189 A. 54 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1937), had applied the unanticipated-
circumstances doctrine, the outcome would likely have been different. 
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There are two different fact patterns in which a parol evidence 
rule issue arises. The first is when the parties' only manifestation of 
assent to an agreement is upon assent to the integrated agreement. 
For example, the parties might agree at the outset of negotiations that 
a binding agreement will not exist unless and until their agreement 
is reduced to a written document signed by both parties. In such a 
situation, only the parol evidence rule is implicated. The preexisting 
duty rule is not implicated because, lacking a prior agreement, there 
was no preexisting duty at the time the parties manifested assent 
to the integrated agreement (at least not stemming from a prior 
agreement). 
The second is when the parties manifest assent to a binding 
agreement (oral or written) and thereafter confirm the agreement 
in an integrated agreement, but the integrated agreement is not 
accurate in all respects. In this situation, the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts treats the confirmation as an offer of substituted terms and 
the offeree's manifestation of assent to the written confirmation as 
an acceptance of those terms. 150 In this situation, not only is the 
parol evidence rule implicated, but the preexisting duty rule as well, 
provided that one of the parties alleges that the integrated agreement 
did not include any new consideration. 
A difficulty is distinguishing between these two situations, 
particularly when the alleged prior agreement is oral. Often, it will be 
unclear whether preliminary, oral negotiations rose to the level of an 
oral contract, or whether the first manifestation of assent was when 
the agreement was reduced to written form. The difficulty might 
arise either from conflicting testimony or from determining, even if 
the facts are undisputed, when the parties' negotiations rose from 
preliminary negotiations to an oral contract. 
In general, it will not be difficult for a party to assert facts that, 
if believed, could lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that an oral 
agreement was formed prior to the integrated agreement. And because 
the parol evidence rule only applies if the integrated agreement is 
binding, 151 and thus does not prevent the use of extrinsic evidence 
150 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 209 cmt. b, illus. 2 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981). 
151 Id.§§ 213(1)-(2). 
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to establish that the integrated agreement lacks consideration, the 
parol evidence rule would not apply when the integrated agreement 
is alleged to be a one-sided modification of a prior oral agreement. 
In other words, the consideration exception provides that, in general, 
the preexisting duty rule prevails over the parol evidence rule in this 
clash of titans. 
Accordingly, if a plaintiff sues for the breach of a promise that 
was not included in an integrated agreement to which the parties 
subsequently manifested assent, the parol evidence rule would not 
apply if the plaintiff alleges that the parties formed an enforceable oral 
contract prior to the integrated agreement and that the only difference 
between the two is the omission from the integrated agreement of 
the promise sued upon. Because the court, when applying the parol 
evidence rule, must assume the existence of the prior promise or 
agreement, the court cannot apply the parol evidence rule since, as 
a result of the assumption, the integrated agreement is considered 
non-binding under the preexisting duty rule. The proponent of the 
extrinsic agreement avoids application of the contradiction test and 
the natural-inclusion test and the agreement's existence is submitted 
to the fact-finder for determination. Of course, "slight variations of 
circumstance are commonly held to take a case out of the [preexisting 
duty] rule," 152 but the new performance must in fact be bargained 
for. 153 Thus, at least in the case of a prior oral agreement, the defendant 
could argue that it manifested assent to the integrated agreement in 
exchange for the modification (an exchange of written evidence of 
the deal for the modification), but evidence of an actual bargain of 
this nature would be necessary. 
The Restatement (First) of Contracts provided the following 
illustration of the consideration exception to the parol evidence rule 
based on the preexisting duty rule: 
A and B make an integrated agreement by which A 
promises to complete an unfinished building according 
to certain plans and specifications, and B promises to 
pay A $2000 for so doing. It may be shown that by 
a contract made previously A had promised to erect 
and complete the building for $10,000; that he had 
not fully completed it though paid the whole price. 
152 Id.§ 73 cmt. c. 
153 Id. cmt. a. 
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This evidence is admissible because it establishes 
that there is not sufficient consideration for the new 
agreement, since A is promising no more than he is 
bound by his original contract to perform. 154 
339 
This illustration was used as support in Guaranty Trust Co. of 
N. Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co. 155 In Williamsport Wire the trustees 
of a corporation in receivership (Lycoming Trust Co.) sold what they 
believed were the corporation's only remaining assets for $30 at an 
auction on September 17, 1952.156 Around ten days later the trustees 
signed a general assignment in the buyer's favor covering all the 
corporation's remaining claims. 157 
Six years earlier, stockholders, former stockholders, and 
former bondholders of the Williamsport Wire Rope Co. had sued 
to set aside the sale of Williamsport's assets to Bethlehem Steel 
Co. 158 In January 1952 a special master had recommended that the 
sale be set aside and that Bethlehem restore to former stockholders 
whatever stock had been sold to Bethlehem after July 1936.159 In 
December 1936 Lycoming had sold shares it owned in Williamsport 
Wire Rope Co. to Bethlehem, and when the court adopted the special 
master's report on October 14, 1952, Bethlehem paid $6 million 
for distribution to the former Williamsport stockholders (including 
Lycoming). 160 Thus, Lycoming's assets became unexpectedly greater 
than either the liquidating trustees or the buyer had believed at the 
time of the auction and the general assignment. 161 
The trustees and the buyer made conflicting claims to $ 3 00, 000 
of the total amount deposited by Bethlehem for former stockholders. 162 
The special master admitted over objection parol evidence to show 
that the general assignment was not intended to include the claim 
154 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 238 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1932). 
155 222 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1955). 
156 Id. at 418. 
157 Id. 
158 Id.at417. 
159 Id. at 419; Guar. Trust Co. ofN.Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 107 F. Supp. 
759, 760 (M.D. Pa.), vacated, 107 F. Supp. 762 (M.D. Pa. 1952). 
160 Williamsport Wire, 222 F.2d at 419. 
161 Id. at 418. 
162 Id. at 419. 
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against Bethlehem. 163 The special master recommended that the 
trustees prevail, and the district court ruled in their favor. 164 
On appeal, the issue was whether it was error to admit 
such parol evidence. 165 The court held that the parol evidence 
was admissible, among other reasons, to show that if the written 
assignment purported to assign more than had been previously 
agreed upon, the written assignment lacked consideration: 
Parol evidence is also admissible to establish the 
failure of consideration. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 
238, Illustration 2 (1938). Here the appellant had 
already agreed to pay $30 for the assignment and 
transfer of the items on the list in the sheriff's office. 
The sale was completed on September 17, 1952. 
'A sale by auction is complete when the 
auctioneer announces its completion by the 
fall of the hammer, or in other customary 
manner.' Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 69, § 161 (1931). 
Only afterward, possibly more than ten days afterward, 
was the idea of a general assignment put forth by 
appellant as something it wanted in addition to the 
rubber stamp endorsements. Since $30 constituted the 
consideration only for the items on the list referred to 
in the advertisement, the general assignment, if it did 
attempt to give appellant more than what was on the list, 
was without consideration and must accordingly fall. 166 
Thereafter, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, published 
in 1981, included three illustrations involving the parol evidence 
rule and the preexisting duty rule. The first is notable because it 
involved a prior oral agreement that was not discharged because 
the subsequent integrated agreement was a modification without 
consideration, showing that the consideration exception applies even 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 420-21. 
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when the parol evidence rule's evidentiary function is implicated.167 
The second illustration involved an integrated modification induced 
by an agreement not incorporated into the integration, showing 
that if the parol evidence rule discharges the inducing agreement 
thereby causing the modification to be a non-binding modification 
due to lack of consideration (the new consideration having been the 
inducing agreement), the integration is non-binding even though the 
prior agreement would have been part of the integrated agreement 
(thereby supplying consideration) had it not been discharged by 
the parol evidence rule. 168 The third illustration was based on the 
Restatement (First)'s illustration. 169 The comment also stated that 
"[t]he circumstance may ... show an agreement to discharge a prior 
agreement without regard to whether the integrated agreement is 
binding, and such an agreement may be effective."170 
A recent example of a court relying on the Restatement 
(Second) and using the consideration exception to circumvent the 
parol evidence rule is Audubon Indemnity Co. v. Custom Site-Prep, Inc. 171 
In Audubon the issue was whether an indemnification agreement in 
a written subcontract agreement, under which the subcontractor 
promised to indemnify the general contractor, was binding. 172 One 
of the subcontractor's defenses to the indemnification agreement was 
that it lacked consideration. 173 Consistent with their past practices, 
the subcontractor and the general contractor had operated on the 
project pursuant to an oral agreement and did not have a written 
contract until after the subcontractor performed the work on the 
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213 cmt. d, illus. 5 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981). 
168 Id. cmt. d, illus. 6. The illustration was in support of the following statements 
in the comment: "[A]n integrated agreement may be effective to render 
inoperative an oral term which would have been part of the agreement if 
it had not been integrated. The integrated agreement may then be without 
consideration, even though the inoperative term would have furnished 
consideration." Id. cmt. d. 
169 Id. § 214 cmt. c, illus. 5. See also id. § 214 cmt. c, reporter's note ("Illustrations 
5 and 6 are based on Illustrations 2 and 3 to former§ 238."). 
170 Id.§ 213 cmt. d. 
171 358 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). 
172 Id. at 312. 
173 Id. at 313. 
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project. 174 The general contractor and the subcontractor had not 
discussed indemnification at the time of the oral contract. 175 
After the work was completed, the subcontractor sent an 
invoice to the general contractor and the general contractor cut a 
check for the amount invoiced. 176 But before tendering the check, the 
general contractor signed and sent a written "subcontract agreement" 
to the subcontractor under which the subcontractor promised to 
perform the work (already performed), and also promised to indemnify 
the general contractor for any claims based on the subcontractor's 
work. 177 The written agreement included a merger clause. 178 The 
parties testified that the general contractor typically required the 
subcontractor to sign a written, form subcontract agreement before 
the general contractor paid for the work and that they were typically 
signed after the work was completed. 179 The subcontractor signed 
the written agreement. 180 
Thereafter, the project owner sued the general contractor 
based on the subcontractor's negligence, and the trial court ordered 
the dispute to arbitration. 181 The arbitrator found in favor of the 
owner, and the general contractor's insurance carrier paid the award. 182 
The insurance carrier then sued the subcontractor for contractual 
indemnity under the subcontract agreement's indemnification 
provision. 183 
The subcontractor argued that the indemnification agreement 
was unenforceable because it lacked consideration, the subcontractor 
having fully performed at the time it was signed and the parties never 
having discussed indemnification at the time of the oral contract. 184 
In response, the insurance carrier argued that the subcontractor's 
lack of consideration defense was barred by the parol evidence 
rule. 185 If the parol evidence rule applied, the insurance carrier would 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 314. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 315, 318. 
185 Id. at 315. 
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prevail because a lack of an indemnification agreement in the oral 
agreement would obviously conflict with the integrated agreement's 
indemnification provision. 186 The insurance carrier also argued that 
signing an indemnification agreement was an implied term of the 
oral contract. 187 
The appellate court rejected the insurance carrier's parol 
evidence rule argument, holding that a court may consider parol 
evidence to show a lack of consideration, citing to, among other 
authority, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 188 The court also 
held that parol evidence was admissible to determine whether the 
integrated agreement was the only agreement (simply memorializing 
the prior oral agreement) or whether it was a modification of a prior 
oral contract thereby needing independent consideration. 189 The court 
stated that "[i] f the terms of a subsequent written contract differ 
from what the parties intended in their original oral agreement-Le., 
if the written contract modified the agreed upon terms-the written 
contract requires new consideration."190 
Thus, as shown by Williamsport Wire and Audubon Indemnity, 
the parol evidence rule can be circumvented by an allegation that the 
integrated agreement was a one-sided modification of a prior oral 
contract. Having made such an allegation, the consideration exception 
applies, and the issue proceeds past the parol evidence rule and goes 
directly to the fact-finder to determine whether the prior oral contract 
was made and, if so, its scope. If the fact-finder concludes that the 
prior contract existed and that the integrated agreement was a one-
sided modification, the integrated agreement is unenforceable under 
the preexisting duty rule. 
It bears noting, however, that the consideration exception is 
inapplicable in a variety of situations. For example, if the agreement 
is considered a transaction in goods, 191 the preexisting duty rule and 
the consideration exception could not be used to circumvent the 
parol evidence rule because under the U.C.C. consideration is not 
186 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) ("A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the 
extent that it is inconsistent with them."). 
187 Audubon, 358 S.W. 3d at 316. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 316-17. 
190 Id. 
191 See U.C.C. § 2-102 ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies 
to transactions in goods .... ") (AM. LAW INST. & UN!F. LAW COMM'N 2012). 
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necessary for a contract modification. 192 Thus, because the U.C.C. 
retains the parol evidence rule, 193 yet discards the preexisting duty 
rule (at least with respect to contract modifications), 194 when the 
agreement is a transaction in goods the parol evidence rule trumps 
the preexisting duty rule. 
Also, as previously discussed, if the prior agreement is 
voidable or unenforceable, the preexisting duty rule does not apply 
and the parol evidence rule trumps the preexisting duty rule. Thus, 
if the party who would ordinarily invoke the consideration exception 
happened to have contracted with a party who had the power to void 
the original contract (say, due to infancy), that party could no longer 
invoke the exception. The consideration exception would also not 
apply to oral agreements within the Statute of Frauds. For example, 
assume that in the well-known case of Mitchill v. Lath the buyer and 
seller had formed an oral contract for the sale of the parcel of land 
and the removal of the offensive icehouse before assenting to the 
integrated agreement. 195 This oral agreement would be unenforceable 
under the Statute of Frauds' land-contract provision. 196 Even if the 
subsequent integrated agreement omitted the promise to remove 
the icehouse, with all other consideration remaining the same, 
the integrated agreement would be binding because the prior oral 
agreement was unenforceable. Thus, the consideration exception to 
the parol evidence rule would not apply. 
While such results have the effect of reinforcing the parol 
evidence rule by narrowing the consideration exception, there is no 
logical connection between the cases in which it is narrowed and the 
rule's purposes. Using the consideration exception for cases involving 
the preexisting duty rule (as opposed to say, showing that the recited 
consideration is a sham) results in a hodgepodge of disparate results 
driven by the finer points of the preexisting duty rule, rather than 
by the parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping purposes. 
Interestingly, however, most courts and attorneys are likely 
unaware of this parol evidence rule loophole. For example, in Petereit 
v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., the plaintiffs, who were distributors, sued the 
defendant manufacturer for breach of an oral contract under which 
192 Id.§ 2-209(1). 
193 Id. § 2-202. 
194 Id.§ 2-209(1). 
195 Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 646 (N.Y. 1928). 
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 125(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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the defendant promised not to realign the plaintiffs' sales territories. 197 
The district court, acting as fact-finder, found that the parties 
had formed an oral contract when, at a meeting, the defendant's 
representative laid out the terms of the proposed business relationship 
and the distributors then began delivering products within days of the 
meeting (and in some instances even before) .198 Consistent with the 
defendant's business practice, it sent letters to some of the plaintiffs 
shortly after the meeting or the commencement of the distributorship 
to confirm the terms previously agreed upon. 199 The letters, contrary 
to the oral agreement, noted that the distributor's territory was not 
permanently assigned. 200 The letters requested the distributor to 
contact the defendant if there were any questions or if the letter was 
unclear.201 
On appeal, one of the issues was whether, under the parol 
evidence rule, the written confirmations were an integrated agreement 
that discharged the defendant's prior promise in the oral contract 
that it would not realign the plaintiffs' territories. 202 The appellate 
court acknowledged that "[s] ome, if not all, plaintiffs began their 
business relationship with defendant at a meeting with a [defendant] 
representative."203 The court noted that at a typical meeting the 
defendant made an offer, and "[i] f the distributor accepted, nothing 
else needed to be done to have an enforceable contract."204 Because 
the oral contracts were of an indefinite duration, the Statute of Frauds 
did not render them unenforceable under the Statute's one-year 
provision.205 The court, however, held that the written confirmations, 
sent within a few days of the meeting or the effective date of the 
distributorship, were integrated agreements to which the plaintiffs 
manifested assent by not questioning the terms and by performing 
thereafter for many years.206 As integrated agreements, the letters 
therefore discharged any prior inconsistent terms in the oral contract, 
197 Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1995). 
198 Id.atll73. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 1177. 
203 Id. at 1176. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 1176-78. 
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thereby discharging the prior promise that the sales territories would 
not be altered.207 
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the parol 
evidence rule's evidentiary function, repeatedly referring to the 
preference for written agreements over prior oral agreements 
when discussing the rule. For example, the court stated that 
"[i]t is a cornerstone of contract law that written agreements hold 
a special place in the eyes of the law" and that evidence of a prior 
"unwritten" agreement should not have any effect on an integrated 
agreement. 208 The court noted that "to permit oral testimony, or prior 
or contemporaneous conversations, or circumstances, or usages 
[etc.], in order to ... contradict what is written would be dangerous 
and unjust in the extreme."209 The court stated that permitting oral 
testimony in this case to contradict the written confirmations could 
lead to injustice: 
Were we to hold otherwise, the recipient of a writing 
confirming the terms of a contemporaneous oral 
agreement could escape an unfavorable written 
provision that the recipient believes differs from the 
oral understanding simply by silence. The recipient 
could perform under the agreement and years later 
renounce the written terms of the contract to the 
surprise of the offeror. Such a rule would nullify the 
benefits of reducing an agreement to written form, and 
is one we decline to make. 210 
The court, however, never considered the parol evidence 
rule's consideration exception, and whether the written confirmation, 
although an integrated agreement to which the parties manifested 
assent, was not "binding" under the preexisting duty rule. This 
is particularly surprising because the court treated the written 
confirmation as an offer and acceptance of substituted terms: 
207 Id. at 1179. 
208 Id. at 1177. 
209 Id. (quoting TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp, 589 A.2d 329, 333 (Conn. 
1991) (quoting in turn Glendale Woolen Co. v. The Protection Ins. Co., 21 
Conn. 19, 37 (1851) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)). 
210 Id. at 1178. 
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The logical outcome of the [parol evidence] rule is 
that when there is an oral agreement that one party 
reduces to a writing, the other party's assent to the 
writing, by words or conduct, even though a term of 
the writing differs from the oral understanding, is an 
acceptance of the substituted term .... 
To the extent the writing differed from any oral 
understanding of the parties, it was a substitution of 
new terms. 211 
347 
And although there was a dissenting opinion, it was based solely 
on the belief that the district court had made a factual finding 
that the plaintiffs had not manifested assent to the confirmation 
letters, not that the letters-even if integrated agreements-lacked 
consideration. 212 
IV. Closing the Loophole 
When the parties manifest assent to an integrated agreement, 
and one of the parties disputes the existence or terms of the alleged 
prior agreement, permitting the proponent of the prior agreement 
to invoke the consideration exception based on the preexisting 
duty rule is a parol evidence rule loophole. 213 In such a situation, 
the consideration exception can be used as a means of escaping the 
parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions. To avoid 
frustrating these purposes, the loophole should be closed. 
Of course, applying the consideration exception in such a 
situation is consistent with the parol evidence rule's merger function. 
If the parol evidence rule were based solely on whether the parties 
211 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 209 cmt. b, illus. 2 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981)). 
212 Id. at 1187-88 (Kearse, J., dissenting). The court did not discuss whether the 
contract was governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. If the U.C.C. governed, then 
the consideration exception would not apply because the U.C.C. does not 
require consideration for an effective modification. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (1) (AM. 
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012). 
213 A loophole has been defined as "a means of escape; esp: an ambiguity or omission 
in the text through which the intent of a statute, contract, or obligation may 
be evaded." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 734 (11th ed. 
2003). 
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intended the integrated agreement to supersede the prior agreement, 
such an intention is irrelevant if the integrated agreement is not 
binding under the preexisting duty rule. The preexisting duty rule is 
designed to prevent an agreement from being binding even when the 
parties intended it to supersede a prior agreement. Thus, under the 
merger rationale the preexisting duty rule would, and should, trump 
the parol evidence rule. The merger theorists would have no cause 
to complain, except to the extent they disliked the preexisting duty 
rule, another matter entirely. 
But the use of the consideration exception in a situation 
involving the preexisting duty rule is inconsistent with the parol 
evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions. Under the 
evidentiary theory, the parol evidence rule is not designed to only 
protect against the enforcement of preliminary agreements that the 
parties intended to be superseded by the integrated agreement; it is 
designed to police against fraudulent and mistaken claims of a prior 
agreement. By failing to apply the parol evidence rule's consistency test 
and natural-inclusion test in these situations, the rule's evidentiary 
function of form is lost. Similarly, the rule's gatekeeping function is 
lost, submitting the issue directly to the jury. 
As discussed in Part I, the evidentiary and gatekeeping 
functions remain important justifications for the parol evidence rule. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to ensure that these functions are not 
frustrated by the use of the consideration exception in this fashion. At 
the same time, however, it is necessary to ensure that the preexisting 
duty rule's purpose of policing against extorted modifications will 
not be frustrated. Essentially, there is a conflict between two over-
inclusive rules, each of which should be accommodated to avoid 
frustrating their purposes. The question, of course, is how best to 
accommodate their competing purposes when the rules clash. 
A possible solution would be to simply reject the consideration 
exception for situations involving the preexisting duty rule, and 
to therefore apply the parol evidence rule. If the prior agreement 
contradicts the integrated agreement or it would have been natural 
to include the alleged prior term within the integrated agreement, it 
is discharged, even if the integrated agreement is not supported by 
consideration under the preexisting duty rule. This would fully protect 
the parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions. 
It would do so, however, at the expense of the preexisting 
duty rule's policing function. In many cases there will be no dispute 
that a prior agreement was formed, and the only issue is whether the 
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integrated agreement was intended to supersede terms in the prior 
agreement that were not incorporated into the integrated agreement. 
In such a situation, the parol evidence rule's evidentiary function 
plays a more limited role, and the merger function is more strongly 
implicated. As previously discussed, even when the merger function 
is implicated, the parol evidence rule being cast as a legal formality 
still results in an over-inclusive test to determine intent to merge. 
Thus, simply because the merger function is more strongly implicated 
than the evidentiary function does not mean that the parol evidence 
rule is simply relegated to directly determining the parties' intentions. 
But when the rule's merger function is more strongly 
implicated than its evidentiary function, the preexisting duty rule's 
countervailing extortion-policing function should be accounted for, 
because the merger function is in fact designed to implement the 
parties' intentions, even if in an over-inclusive way. And as previously 
discussed, the preexisting duty rule is designed to render an agreement 
unenforceable despite the parties' intentions that it be enforceable.214 
Accordingly, simply rejecting the consideration exception in cases 
involving the preexisting duty rule should be rejected. 
This discussion, however, points the way to a solution. The 
solution is to be found in identifying the nature of the parol evidence 
rule dispute in a particular case: Are the parties disputing the existence 
of the prior agreement or its terms, or are they simply disputing 
whether the parties intended the prior agreement to be superseded 
by the integrated agreement? In other words, is the parol evidence 
rule's evidentiary function implicated or its merger function? 
If there is a dispute about the existence of the prior agreement 
or its terms, a possible accommodation could be to require the plaintiff 
to prove the prior agreement by clear and convincing evidence, rather 
than by a preponderance of the evidence. 215 As noted by Professor Eric 
Posner, "courts sometimes impose higher evidentiary requirements 
... in order to maintain the spirt of the [parol evidence] rule."216 For 
214 See infra Part II. 
215 See Parker v. Parker, 238 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 1968) ("To verbalize the distinction 
between the differing degrees more precisely, proof by a 'preponderance of 
the evidence' means that a jury must believe that the facts asserted by the 
proponent are more probably true than false; proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt' 
means the facts asserted by the prosecution are almost certainly true; and proof 
by 'clear and convincing evidence' means that the jury must believe that the 
truth of the facts asserted by the proponent is highly probable."). 
216 POSNER, supra note 61, at 149. 
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example, a party seeking to reform an integrated agreement because 
of a mistake in integration must establish the mistake by clear-
and-convincing evidence so as not to frustrate the parol evidence 
rule's purpose.217 Similarly, for the Statute of Frauds' multiple-
documents exception to apply in the absence of explicit incorporation 
by reference, evidence of the connection between the documents 
must be clear and convincing.218 Courts have also held that a party 
who relies on a lost document to satisfy the Statute of Frauds must 
prove the document's contents by clear-and-convincing evidence.219 
And a similar recommendation for the parol evidence rule itself was 
proposed by Dean W. G. Hale, who argued that the rule should create 
a rebuttable presumption that an integrated agreement is complete, 
which could only be overcome by clear-and-convincing evidence. 220 
But under such a solution the fact-finder would likely need to 
be the jury. As previously discussed, to maintain the legitimacy of the 
parol evidence rule as an issue of law for the court, the court should 
not make factual findings. And if the jury, rather than the court, is 
the fact-finder, the parol evidence rule's gatekeeping function will 
be frustrated. 
A solution that would preserve the parol evidence rule's 
evidentiary and gatekeeping functions would be to have the parol 
evidence rule apply when the evidentiary function is implicated 
but not when the merger function is implicated. A party, however, 
should not be permitted to invoke the parol evidence rule by simply 
denying the existence of the prior agreement. Rather, some minimal 
showing should be necessary to ensure that the parol evidence rule's 
evidentiary function is truly implicated. As previously discussed, 
the court should (for the most part) not act as the fact-finder when 
resolving a parol evidence rule issue. Accordingly, the required 
showing by the defendant should not involve the court weighing the 
evidence and acting as a finder of fact. 
The solution is to invoke the summary-judgment standard 
and determine whether there exists a genuine dispute of material 
217 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
218 Id.§ 132 cmt. a. 
219 See, e.g., Weinsier v. Soffer, 358 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding 
that proof of the contents of a lost document must be "clear, strong and 
unequivocal"). 
220 W. G. Hale, TheParolEvidenceRule, 4 OR. L. REV. 91, 122 (1925). 
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fact. 221 The parol evidence rule's evidentiary function would thus 
only be implicated if the party seeking to invoke the parol evidence 
rule introduces sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable fact-finder 
to conclude that the prior agreement, as alleged by the opposing 
party, did not exist. Because the parol evidence rule is considered a 
substantive rule, and not a rule of evidence, 222 the court would apply 
the summary-judgment standard of the state whose law governs the 
dispute. 223 The burden of establishing that there is a genuine dispute 
regarding the prior agreement's existence should be placed on the 
party invoking the parol evidence rule because it is seeking to displace 
the consideration exception. 
If the party invoking the parol evidence rule introduces 
admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute regarding whether the 
alleged prior agreement existed or regarding its terms, a presumption 
should arise that the parol evidence rule will apply, so that the rule's 
evidentiary and gatekeeping functions are preserved. If, however, 
the party invoking the rule does not create a genuine dispute, and 
only the merger function of the parol evidence rule is implicated, 
the consideration exception should apply (because the issue of 
intent to supersede does not trump the preexisting duty rule) and 
the undisputed prior agreement would be admissible to render the 
integrated agreement unenforceable under the preexisting duty rule. 
But having the accommodation hinge solely on whether 
there is a genuine dispute of fact regarding the existence of the prior 
agreement might undercut the preexisting duty rule's function of 
policing for extortion. For example, the parol evidence rule might 
discharge a prior agreement and thus enforce the subsequent 
integrated agreement even though the subsequent agreement might 
have been a modification without consideration, which ordinarily 
raises the suspicion of extortion. Accordingly, further refinement 
221 See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if 
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). 
222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
223 State summary-judgment standards often differ from the federal standard. 
See JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, 
and Democratic Values, 3 7 AKRON L. REV. 717, 769 (2004) (discussing the 
differences). 
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is necessary to not sacrifice the preexisting duty rule's extortion-
policing function. 
The appropriate refinement is to provide the proponent of the 
prior agreement with the opportunity to create a genuine dispute as 
to whether she manifested assent to the integrated agreement as a 
result of the other party's wrongful refusal to perform the alleged 
prior agreement. If the proponent carries this burden, then the parol 
evidence rule would not apply and the fact-finder would decide 
whether the prior agreement existed, what its terms were (so as to 
determine if there was consideration for the integrated agreement), 
and whether the parties intended the subsequent integrated agreement 
to supersede the prior agreement. This refinement accommodates the 
preexisting duty rule's extortion-policing function. 
To show how this proposed solution works, we will return to 
the hypothetical involving the building and painting of the toolshed 
discussed in the Introduction.224 The plaintiff sues a defendant for 
breach of the alleged prior agreement to paint the toolshed, a promise 
that was not incorporated into the integrated agreement, which only 
included a promise to build the toolshed. In response, the defendant 
argues that the prior agreement was discharged under the parol 
evidence rule because it would have been natural to include such a 
promise in the integrated agreement. In reply, the plaintiff alleges 
that the parties formed an oral agreement prior to the integrated 
agreement, and that the only difference between the alleged prior 
agreement and the integrated agreement is that the defendant's 
promise to paint the toolshed was not included in the integrated 
agreement. The plaintiff argues that the integrated agreement was 
therefore an attempted modification that lacked consideration under 
the preexisting duty rule and is thus not binding. 
Under existing law, because the court must assume the 
existence of the prior agreement as alleged by the plaintiff, and 
because of the consideration exception, the parol evidence rule 
would not apply (no "binding" integrated agreement) and the issue 
of the agreement's existence and its terms would be submitted to 
the fact-finder for determination. Although the fact-finder might 
conclude, under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that the 
prior agreement was not formed, or, if formed, that the integrated 
agreement included modifications favorable to both parties and was 
224 See infra Introduction. 
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intended to supersede the prior agreement (leading to a conclusion 
that the integrated agreement is a binding modification), the benefits 
of the parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping functions 
are frustrated. 
Under this Article's proposed approach, if the defendant 
introduced admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute of fact 
as to whether the prior agreement existed as alleged-such as by 
submitting an affidavit denying the alleged promise or so testifying 
in court-a presumption would arise that the parol evidence rule 
will apply, so that its evidentiary and gatekeeping functions are not 
frustrated. For example, the defendant might testify that he never 
promised the plaintiff that he would paint the toolshed. The plaintiff 
would then be given an opportunity to introduce admissible evidence 
creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant 
threatened not to perform the original agreement unless the plaintiff 
agreed to the modification. If the plaintiff does so, then the parol 
evidence rule would not apply. For example, the plaintiff might testify 
that the defendant threatened to not build the toolshed unless she 
signed the integrated agreement. 
Adopting this Article's solution would not threaten the parol 
evidence rule's general exception for admitting extrinsic evidence to 
support invalidating causes, such as illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, 
or sham consideration.225 An integrated agreement is not designed 
to render evidence of such invalidating causes inadmissible, whereas 
the very purpose of an integrated agreement is to render inadmissible 
evidence of a prior agreement. Thus, the proposed solution is 
appropriately limited to the situation involving the consideration 
exception and the preexisting duty rule. 
Let us now return to the facts of Williamsport Wire, Audubon 
Indemnity, and Petereit to analyze how the analysis would proceed 
under the facts of those cases. In Williamsport Wire there was no 
genuine dispute as to the scope of the parties' prior agreement; it 
was undisputed that the prior agreement did not include a claim for 
stock sold to Bethlehem.226 Accordingly, the parol evidence rule's 
evidentiary function was not implicated, and it would be appropriate 
to apply the consideration exception and to admit the prior agreement. 
225 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 214(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
226 Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 222 F.2d 416, 419-20 
(3d Cir. 1955). 
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In Audubon Indemnity, however, there was a genuine dispute as 
to whether the parties had agreed, even if impliedly, as part of their 
oral agreement as to whether an indemnification agreement would 
be part of the deal. Accordingly, the insurance carrier would be able 
to create a genuine dispute regarding the terms of the prior oral 
agreement. Thus, a presumption would arise that the parol evidence 
rule applies. The subcontractor did not argue that it manifested 
assent to the integrated agreement as a result of wrongful pressure. 
Although the parties agreed that the general contractor typically 
required the subcontractor to sign a written agreement before being 
paid,227 there was no allegation that the general contractor pressured 
the subcontractor to sign the written agreement, the subcontractor 
alleging that the general contractor told the subcontractor that it (the 
general contractor) needed a written document in its file relating to 
payment.228 Accordingly, the parol evidence rule should have applied. 
In Petereit, the defendant maintained that no specific 
territories had been assigned to distributors on a permanent basis.229 
Accordingly, there existed a genuine dispute as to whether there was 
an oral agreement for permanent territories, and the plaintiffs did not 
allege that they assented to the written confirmations as a result of 
a threat by the defendant to not perform the existing oral contract. 
Thus, the court was correct to apply the parol evidence rule. 
V. Conclusion 
Applying the parol evidence rule's consideration exception 
to a situation in which the proponent of extrinsic evidence alleges 
that an integrated agreement is not binding because it modifies a 
prior agreement and lacks consideration under the preexisting duty 
rule threatens the parol evidence rule's evidentiary and gatekeeping 
functions. It is therefore a parol evidence rule loophole, and an 
accommodation between the parol evidence rule and the preexisting 
duty rule is necessary. The appropriate accommodation is to apply the 
parol evidence rule if the party seeking to invoke the rule creates a 
genuine dispute as to whether the prior agreement existed, unless the 
proponent of the extrinsic evidence creates a genuine dispute as to 
227 Audubon Indem. Co. v. Custom Site-Prep, Inc., 358 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
228 Id. 
229 Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1177 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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whether she manifested assent to the integrated agreement because 
the other party wrongfully threated to breach the prior contract. Such 
an approach accommodates the parol evidence rule's evidentiary 
and gatekeeping functions and the preexisting duty rule's extortion-
policing function. 
